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PROPERTY IN CHURCH-PEWS, MARKET-STALLS
AND LOTS IN CEMETERIES.
Txz law relating to the acquisition of property by religious soci-
eties, is a subject upon which volumes have been written and num-
berless decisions rendered, and as to which the local laws of the
diferent states vary very materially. The restrictions as to the
smount of property which they may hold, its value and annual
inome, are greater in some of the states than in others. The
manner of acquisition is also a matter regulated by the constitu-
tions and laws of the respective states. These restrictions are the
consequences of the old English Statutes of Mortmain, which, orig-
inating with the great charter of Henry HI., and running through
subsequent reigns with various changes rendered necessary by the
subtle constructions given to them by the ecclesiastical jurists, have
outlived the feudal age which gave them birth, and are felt even in
this country at the present time. It is not the purpose of the writer
to attempt to go into an examination of that subject, but to give in
a concise form the law as to the nature and extent of the tenure
which individuals may posess in that species of church property
known as "pews." The subject of market-stalls is also included
in this paper, because the rights of the holders of that species of
property are analogous to the rights of holders of pews. The sub-
ject of lots in cemeteries will be hereafter considered.
L Pews were not used in the English churches until long after the
Reformation, probably about the middle of the seventeenth century,
VoL. XXVIII-1 (1)
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and the manner of acquiring a right to them was very different from
what it is in this country to-day. Blackstone speaks of the right
to sit in a pew as being a personal one, descending by immemorial
custom from ancestor to heir, in the nature of an heirloom, free
from ecclesiastical concurrence. Chitty, in his General Practice,
says, that it is an incorporeal interest in real estate, giving to the
holder of the pew the right to use it for the purposes of divine sei
vice. That the right to occupy a particular pew arose either by
prescription as appurtenant to a messuage, which presupposed a
faculty, or from an actual faculty or grant from the ordinary, in
whom existed the right to make disposition of all the pews not
already claimed by prescription: 1 Gibson's Cod. 221; 1 Phill.
316; Corven's Case, 12 Rep. 105; Fuller v. Lane, 2 Add. 247.
A distinction was also made between the right to occupy a seat in
the body of the church and one in the aisle or chancel; in the former
case it being necessary that the right should rest upon a prescrip-
tion appurtenant to a messuage in the parish. The same rule
applied to a faculty, which was a grant from the ordinary to the
parishioners, who were then placed, according to rank and station,
by the churchwardens.
Best, in his Law of Presumptions, says, that by the general law
and of common right, there is no such thing as property in pews;
that they are for the use and accommodation of the parish at large;
that it is only in the light of an easement appurtenant to a mes-
suage, that courts of common law will consider the right to a pew.
Crabb, in his Law of Real Property, says that there can be no per-
sonal property in a pew. That every man who settles as a house-
holder has a right to call on the parish for a convenient seat. The
doctrine was that the soil and freehold of the church was in the
parson; that the use of the church and keeping it in repair was in
the parishioners, and that the disposition of the seats belonged to
the ordinary: Boothby v. Baily, Hobart 69.
There was no such thing as a sale or transfer of a pew. Being
annexed by prescription to a messuage, it passed with the house to
the tenant thereof for the time being, who had, de jure, the pre-
scriptive right to the pew. 1 Hagg. Cons. 319.
Corven's Case, 12 Rep. 105 (Lord COKE), is probably the oldest
case on this subject (1655). See also, the following cases: K n-
rick v. Taylor, 1 Wilson 326 (1752); Stocks v. Booth, 1 Term
Rep. 428 (1786); Roger v. Brooks, Id. 431; Griffith v. Mat-
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thewa, 5 Id. 296 (1793); Mainwaring v. Gie8, 5 B. & A. 356,
(1822); Wyllie v. Afott, 3 Eng. Eccles. Rep. 19 (1827); Bryan
v. Whistler, 8 B. & 0. 294 (1828); Reynolds v. Aonkton, 2 Moo.
& R. 384 (1841); Hinde-v. Chorlton, Law Rep. 2 0. P. 104
(1866). In many of the English churches of the present day the
seats are free, in others the pews are rented, and the old manorial
cuatoms and privileges are gradually becoming obsolete.
In this country there has been some discordance in the decisions
of the different states. In the case of Daniel v. Wood, 1 Pick.
102, the plaintiff brought an action of trespass qyare clausum
fregit, to recover damages for the destruction' of his pew, which
had been demolished in the enlarging of the church. The court
held that he could not maintain trespass, but that if he had suffered
in his property, through the destruction of the old and the erection
of the new meeting-house, he might maintain an action on the case
to recover reasonable damages. That he had a qualified property
in the pew, viz.: the exclusive right to occupy it for the purpose
of attending public worship, which right was subject to the right
in the parish (in which was the title to the ground and building) to
take down and rebuild the meeting-house, and to make such altera-
tions as the good of the society might require.
In Gay v. Baker, 17 Mass. 437, the plaintiff brought trespass
against the defendant, as one of a committee appointed by the par-
ish to enlarge the church, for the taking down of the plaintiff's pew.
The court held, that although the property of the plaintiff is to be
treated as real estate, it is not subject to the same principles of law
as govern property in a farm. That the pew-owner can maintain
trespass against any one who disturbs him in his seat, but that if
the church is rebuilt and the pew destroyed in doing so, then, all
the pew-owner can claim, is indemnity on just and equitable princi-
ples, and no more.
In Howard v. First Parish, &c., 7 Pick. 138, the pew-owner
brought an action on the case against the parish for pulling down a
church and thereby demolishing his pew; but the court held that
where a meeting-house is so old and ruinous that the jury may say
it was necessary to take it down, then the pew-holder shall not be
wmpensated; but otherwise, if the church is in good condition, oi
if the taking was a matter of expediency rather than of necessity.
In Kimball v. Second Parish in. Bowly, 24 Pick. 349, it was
held that. property in a pew is real estate in Massachusetts, except
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in the city of Boston, and may be transferred by all the modes f
conveyance applicable to real estate, and with greater facilities for
perpetuating the evidence of title.
In Jackson v. Bounsevn7le, 5 Metcalf 127, it was held that tres-
pass. q. c. f. was the proper action for violation of the right of posses-
sion of a pew, and the court expressed the opinion that it was by no
means certain that a religious society, constituted in the usual way,
had the authority further than such as is tacitly conferred by
acquiescence on the part of the congregation from a spirit of
courtesy, to loan the use of houses of worship for objects and pur-
poses in which the pew-owners have no interest or concern.
In the case of Fiher v. Glover, 4 N. H. 181, it appeared that
the plaintiff's action was based upon a removal of the church to
another locality which was more convenient to the whole congrega-
tion. The court held that although the grant of an exclusive use
in a pew confers a right which is to be protected, that yet that
right is acquired subject to the rights of 'the society to have the
meeting-house in such place as will best accommodate the whole.
In Kellog v. Dickinson, 18 Vermont 266, which was an action
to recover for the demolition of the plaintiff's pew, the court held
that property in a pew partakes of real estate, and that the owner
can maintain trespass vi et armis, if disturbed in his possession, and
that he has the right to have the house used as a place of public
worship, if it can be done, and if the parish abandons it, he is
entitled to demand compensation. If, however, the church becomes
wholly ruinous, there is no beneficial interest left in the pew-holder
for which he can claim compensation. See also Howe v. Stevens,
47 Vermont 262.
In the case of 6%urch, ic., v. Wells'8 _Ez'rs, 12 Harris 251
(Penn.), it appeared that Wells had loaned money to the church, for
the recovery of which this action was brought by his executors.
The church pleaded set-off, under which the defendant claimed pew-
rent from the death of Wells up to the time of trial. It was shown
that his family had occupied the pew after his death, and had paid
the rent regularly up to a certain date, and had then ceased paying,
and that the rent was in arrears for a specified period, as pleaded by
way of set-off. In delivering his opinion in the appellate court, the
judge says, "A pew-right is not of such a character as to prevent
an absolute sale of the church edifice, either by contract or by judi-
cial process; by itself it was never known as a subject of taxation;
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if the edifice burns down, the pew-right is gone; it does not pre-
vent the society from tearing down and rebuilding the edifice, or
from altering the whole interior arrangement of it; it does not
authorize the pew-holder to change and decorate the pew according
to his fancy, or to cut it down and carry it away; and it gives himi
no right to the ground on which it stands. It is, therefore, a right
that is entirely peculiar, and yet it is a sort of interest in real
estate. * * * It is; in its nature, scarcely divisible among heirs,
and can scarcely be said to be the subject of an action of partition
or ejectment, or of decree of sale by the Orphans' Court for the
payment of debts. As property, therefore, it is so conditional and
impermanent that it cannot be called real estate, and it must neces-
sarily pass to the personal representatives. But in its very nature
it could not pass to them for use, for they do not succeed to the
opinions of the deceased. It passes merely for sale as part of the
assets, and they sell it subject to its burdens, if the sale is not
needed for creditors, the family may be allowed to hold it together,
and if they do so, there is no one to charge the executor with a
devastavit in not selling it." * * * "There can be no recovery
for the rent accruing after his death, except so far as it can be
obtained by the remedy provided by the church itself in the sale
of the pew, or by a resort to those who actually occupied it, and
such was thejudgment of the court below."
In the state of New York the law on the subject has been some-
what unsettled. In the case of Trustees of the First Baptist
Church v. Bigelow, 16 Wend. 28, an action of assumpsit was
brought to recover the price of a pew. The defendant relied upon
there being no writing binding upon him. The plaintiff contended
that no writing was necessary, but the court held as follows:
"Although the interest acquired in a pew in a church is a limited
and qualified interest, it is, notwithstanding, an interest in real
estate, and requires a writing to support it if the interest extends
beyond a lease for one year."
See also Baptist Church v. Witherill, 3 Paige 302; ,S'haw v. Bev-
eridge, 3 Hill 26; St. Paul's Church v. Ford, 34 Barb. 18. On
subject of altering, rebuilding or removing church, see also Vielie
v. Osgood, 8 Barb. 130; Voorhies v. Presbyterian, &c., 17 Id.
103; Cooper v. Trustees, 32 Id. 222. And as to same in New
Jersey, see Vanifouten v. McKelway, 17 N. J. Ch. 126. See
also First Baptist, &c., v. Grant, 59 Me. 250; Proprietors of
Union, fc., v. Bowell, 66 Id. 400.
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In the case of Hatcheson v. Tilden, &c., 4 H. & MeH. 279
(Md.), it appeared that the plaintiff was a candidate for the office
of sheriff. The constitution of Maryland required, as a qualifica-
tion, that the candidate should possess real and personal praperty,
within the state, above the value of 10001., at the time of being
voted for. The plaintiff not having the requisite property, his
counsel offered to give evidence of a right of the plaintiff to a pew
in a church, as heir-at-law of his father, who had held the said pew;
and he alleged that this pew was real property, which had fallen to
the plaintiff by descent. But this was rejected by the court without
argument.
But in the case of Stoddert v. The Vestry, &c., 2 G. & J. 227,
in which an action of assumpsit was instituted by the vestry against
the appellant to recover the price of a pew, the plaintiff proved at
the trial below, by one of the vestry, that he had himself acted as
auctioneer, and had struck off the pew to Stoddert as being the
highest bidder, and had at the time made a memorandum in pencil
of the name of the purchaser and the price, which memorandum
was delivered to the register of the vestry, who transcribed it in the
record-book, and which memorandum was lost and could not be
found. The defendant prayed the court to exclude the parol evi-
dence as to sale of pew and purchase thereof by the defendant, but
the court below declined to do so, and the verdict being against him,
the defendant appealed. Upon appeal the court said: "The parol
evidence offered of a sale of a pew was inadmissible, because it would
have established a contract different from that contained in the lost
memorandum. No parol evidence is admissible to add to or vary
the memorandum." The memorandum having been shown to have
been lost, it is difficult to understand the court's ruling upon any
other theory than that it assumed a pew to be real property, and
therefore as coming within the operation and effect of the fourth
section of the Statute of Frauds.
In Louisiana, a pew is classed as real estate. In the Matter of
the Successors of Robert Gamble, 23 La. Ann. 9, it appeared that
Gamble died without heirs, either in the ascending or descending
line. He gave by his will to his wife certain lots 'of ground and
other specific property, and also gave her "all my personal property
of whatever name or nature soever, intending this bequest to include
everything of which I am now possessed, except real estate." He
concluded the disposition of his property as follows: "I give and
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bequeath unto my sister, Mary Gamble, all the remainder of my
property, not hereby otherwise disposed of, of every name, nature
and kind whatsoever." A pew which he owned at the time of his
death, was treated by his executor as real estate, and assigned to
Miss Mary Gamble. Mrs. Gamble, the widow, had claimed it as
being personal property, and as belonging to her under the will, and
appealed from the judgment awarding it to Mary Gamble. In its
opinion, affirming the judgment of the lower court, the appellate
court said: "The right to the use of a pew has been defined to be
an incorporeal interest in real property. In a few of the states of
this union, pews are considered as real estate; in others, as personal
property. In the state of New York the precise nature of such pro-
perty does not seem to be well settled. * * *
"The pew, then, was properly assigned to Mary Gamble, as it
is embraced by that clause of the will in which the testator declares,
II give and bequeath to my sister, Mary Gamble, all the remainder
of my property, not hereby otherwise disposed of, of every name,
nature and kind whatsoever.'"
Washburne, in vol. 1, § 83, of his Law of Real Property, says:
"Pews in churches are in some states declared by statute to be real,
in others personal estate. In the absence of such statute, they par-
take of the nature of realty, although the ownership is that of an
exclusive easement for special purposes, since the general property in
the house usually belongs to the parish or corporation that erected it."
From the foregoing the following deduction may be drawn as
to this class of property. That exclusive of all statutory provision
on the subject, the ownership of a pew in a church gives the holder
a qualified, and not an absolute property in the same. His right
is exclusive so far as the full enjoyment and use of the pew for the
purposes of divine service are concerned, and he may maintain an
action of trespass or of case, according to circumstances, if disturbed
in that use and enjoyment. This exclusive right is, however, to be
exercised subject to the right of the church society to repair, rebuild,
or remove the meeting-house, should the welfare of the whole body
require it. It is not, strictly speaking, realty, but is an incorporeal
interest in real estate, in the nature of an easement therein. The
owner of the pew cannot alter or decorate his pew so as to make it
differ from the other pews in the church, nor can he deal with it in
a manner not consistent with the purposes for which pews are con-
structed, nor has he any title to the ground upon which it rests.
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In the absence of state statutes on the subject, it would, upon the
death of the owner, pass to his personal representatives as part of
the assets of his estate, and in the Pennsylvania case above referred
to, it was decided that no rent accruing after his death could be
recovered from his estate, but that the remedy was in rem against
the pew, under the church regulations, or by suit against the per-
sons who had actually occupied it since his death. It so far par-
takes of real estate that a writing is necessary to support a transfer
of interest in it. In the absence of local statutory exemptions of
such property, there is no reason why an interest in a pew should
not be seized and sold under an execution, as in the ease of any
other interest in lands, tenements and hereditaments.
In the case of the -Presbyterian Congregation of Erie v. (olt's
Executors, 2 Grant's Cas. 75, a judgment had been obtained against
the plaintiff in error, and a ft. fa. issued and levied on the meeting-
house and ground. The plaintiff in error thereupon filed a motion
to set aside said levy, on the ground that the lot of land and
meeting-house thereon, being property used for religious purposes,
were not subject to levy and sale; which motion was overruled by
the court below, and a writ of error thereupon sued out. The pro-
ceedings were affirmed by the higher court, which held that a church
and the lot upon which it is erected are private property, and sub-
ject to levy and sale in the same manner as other private property.
In the case in 12 Harris 251, above referred to, it was held that a
pew right is not of such a character as to prevent an absolute sale
of the church edifice, either by contract or by judicial process. The
right, then, to seize and sell the greater, would clearly include the
same course of procedure against the lesser tenure. The pew-holder
has a usufructuary right which may be destroyed by a sale, or by
fire, or by the action of time: Freligh v. -Platt, 5 Cowen 494.
II. Stall# in Markets.-The law applicable to the character and
nature of the property in market-stalls, is, so far as *the writer has
been able to discover, very scant. A number of decisions have
been rendered upon the question of the extent of the power of a
municipal corporation to establish and regulate markets, but with
the exception of the Maryland decision, below referred to, he has
been unable to find an express exposition of the nature and extent
of the ownership of this class of property.
Dillon, in vol. 1 of his work on Municipal Corporations, says that
if the title to the land purchased for the erection of a market-house
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be taken by the municipal corporation in fee, no length of use of
the same for a market will dedicate it for market purposes; and the
markets may be abandoned or changed at the will of the council,
and the land thus acquired and held be sold. And he further says
that the right to establish a market includes the right to abandon it%
or shift it to another place, when the public convenience demands it
and of this the council is the Judge.
In the case of Wartman Y. ft, ft., 33 Penn. St. (9 Casey)
202, it appeared that the old market-house was about to be demol-
ished under competent authority and new property purchased for
the erection of a new market building. The plaintiff applied for a
special injunction, contending that the city was a mere trustee for
the farmers and victuallers, or country people, and bound to main-
tain the markets for their use at the places where they then were,
and that the city had no authority to remove the market except
with their consent. But the Supreme Court held that the council
was but exercising a right which it possessed to remove the location
of the market from one place to another, where the people would
enjoy greater conveniences and where the accommodations would
be better. That it was true that the persons bringing provisions to
the market had a sort of interest in it, but not such an interest as
entitled them to a voice in its regulation.
See also on same point, Gall v. Cincinnati, &c., 18 Ohio
(Critchfield) 563.
In the recent case of Bose v. Mrayor and City Council, &c., not
yet reported except in 2 Md. Law Record 81, the question was as
to the rights of owners of market-stalls, and the nature and extent
of their tenure. The action was brought by the appellees to recover
the amount of certain promissory notes given by the appellant for
the purchase-money agreed to be paid for two butchers' stalls in one
of the public markets of Baltimore city. -At the public sale of the
stalls in the market, the appellant had paid part of the purchase-
money in cash, and had given these notes for the balance, and had
accepted a receipt from the comptroller, describing the stalls and stat-
ing that they were sold subject to the ordinances then existing, or
thereafter to be passed by the city regulating markets. The appel-
lant at once took possession, and paid regularly the annual rent and
license fee required to be paid. At the trial below, the defendant,
afterwards appellant, contended that the appellees had sold to him
VOL. XXVIIL-2
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a larger interest or estate in the stalls than they were authorized
by law to sell.
That the absence of a limitation as to the duration of the right
which the appellant was to have in the stalls, made it a sale of the
entire freehold, interest and estate of the corporation in the stalls,
and that inasmuch as the corporation was required by law to hold
the ground in trust for the purposes of a market, such sale was in
contravention of that special trust, and therefore was made without
legal authority, and that the corporation had transcended its autho-
rity. Upon the appeal taken by Rose, the Court of Appeals held
as follows: "This contention results, as we think, from a miscon-
ception of the nature of the right or estate acquired by the pur-
chaser of the stalls. The purchase of these stalls in a public
market, like the purchase of a pew in a church, does not confer on
the purchaser an absolute property, but a qualified right only.
The right acquired is in the nature of an easement in, not a title
to, a freehold in the land, and such right or easement is limited in
duration to the existence of the market and it is to be understood
as acquired subject to such changes and modifications in the market
during its existence as the public needs may require. The pur-
chase confers an exclusive right to occupy the particular stalls,
with their appendages, for the purposes of the market, and none
other. If the owner be disturbed in the possession of the stalls, he
may maintain case or trespass, according to the nature and circum-
stances of the injury, against the wrongdoer. But he cannot con-
vert them to any other use than that for which they were sold, and
in the use of them, he is required to conform to the regulations of
the market as prescribed by the ordinances of the city. This is by
analogy to the principles applied in respect to the rights of pew-
holders, and in our opinion the analogy between those rights and
the right acquired in the stalls is sufficiently exact to make the
principles applicable in the one case, equally applicable in the
other."
This interest or ownership in a market-stall may be seized under
legal process, in the same way as other property of a debtor, and at
the death of the owner a stall would go to his personal represen-
tatives.
Lots in cemeteries, will be considered in a succeeding number.
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